The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative analysis of the English resultative construction in a framework of cognitive grammar and to illustrate its superiority over existing syntactic and lexical-semantic approaches to the phenomenon. The analysis here makes use of a graphic representation of an integrated cognitive model, based on Langacker's (1990) canonical event model and Croft's (1990) causal chain. Moreover, the cognitive linguistic account reveals that the manner in which an event is construed determines whether or not the resultative construction may be employed in a given context.*
Introduction
The present paper deals with the resultative construction, such as the examples in (1). The italicized predicates in (1) are called resultative complements, because they describe the resultant states of the object NPs which the actions denoted by the verbs bring about.
(1) a. Anna wiped the properties of this construction, from both syntactic and lexical-semantic perspectives.
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Secondly, the syntactic category of a resultative complement can be AP, PP, or NP,1 but not VP in English, as shown in (2).
(2) * I shot him [VP die/died]. However, not all strings which meet these conditions are suitable as resultative constructions. Resultative complements apply to direct objects of some transitive verbs as in (1a, c), but they do not apply to others as in (3).
(3) a. *He watched the TV broken. b. *He believed the idea powerful. (Goldberg (1991b: 67) ) Thirdly, resultative complements also apply to subjects of some unaccusative intransitive verbs as in (4), but they do not apply to the subjects of all unaccusative intransitive verbs, nor do they apply to the subjects of unergative intransitive verbs, as in (5) and (6).
(4) The ice froze solid.
(5) * A dreadful storm arose destructive.
(6) *Richard shouted hoarse. Fourthly, resultative complements cannot co-occur with fake objects of unaccusative intransitive verbs, as (7) shows. However, they occasionally can co-occur with fake objects of unergative intransitive verbs, as in (8).
(7) *A dreadful storm arose itself destructive. (8) Richard shouted himself hoarse. Fifthly, most AP resultative complements deal with the endpoint on a scale, as shown by Goldberg (1991a Goldberg ( , 1991b and Napoli (1992) . (9) a. She wrung the shirt {dry/*damp}. b. We heated the coffee {hot/*tepid}. (Napoli (1992: 79)) Finally, we will find the productive use of the resultative construction, although there are differences in judgements of acceptability among speakers in some cases, as (10) suggests.
(10) a. OK/?The rooster crowed the children awake. b. OK/*It rained the golfcourse useless.
In the next section, we will uncover some overarching problems with previous analyses, suggesting the necessity of a more effective analysis to explain the resultative construction.
Previous Analyses
Many researchers have investigated the resultative construction from both syntactic and lexical-semantic perspectives.
First, there are three major syntactic analyses which have been proposed, employing the following notions: (i) the Binary Small Clause Analysis (Hoekstra (1988) , etc.), (ii) the Hybrid Small Clause Analysis (Yamada (1987) , etc.), and (iii) the Ternary Analysis (Carrier and Randall (1989, 1992) , etc.). The three syntactic analyses make different predications about the structure of resultative constructions.
However, we cannot show which is the correct analysis, because each analysis has revealed some defects of others'. Three types of syntactic analyses, therefore, have two strikes against them.
Let us now turn to lexical-semantic analyses of resultative constructions. We will take up three analyses by the following researchers: (i) Levin and Rapoport (1988) , (ii) Carrier and Randall (1989) , and (iii) Jackendoff (1990) . Levin and Rapoport (1988) propose a semantic process whereby the basic meaning of a verb is extended. They call the process Lexical Subordination and claim that it is responsible for producing resultative constructions. Carrier and Randall (1989) claim that the resultative verbs are derived from the base verbs by what they call Resultative Formation. In contrast to the two analyses, which assume that there are two types of verbs, i. e., resultative verbs and their base verbs, Jackendoff (1990) argues that there is only one verb and that a resultative complement is not an argument mentioned in the verb's lexical entry but rather an adjunct, interpreted by what he calls the Resultative Adjunct Rule.
However, none of these analyses can describe and explain three important properties of resultative constructions to be illustrated below.
First, let us look at the simple example in (11).
(11) He threw the suitcase open.
(Goldberg (1991a: 371)) As Goldberg (1991a Goldberg ( , 1991b observes, (11) just means that he forcefully opened the suitcase and may not mean that the suitcase was thrown in some direction, although the verb throw normally entails that the theme moves along a physical path. If the path is literally expressed alongside the resultative complement, then the sentence becomes unacceptable, as in (12).
(12) a. *He threw the suitcase open into the room.
b. *He threw the suitcase into the room open. The previous analyses, however, provide no tenable account of this phenomenon; on the contrary, most of them do not even mention paths in discussing resultative constructions.
Secondly, as Goldberg (1991a Goldberg ( , 1991b and Napoli (1992) observe, most AP resultative complements denote an end of scale, as in (9). Nevertheless, the previous analyses completely miss this generation.
Thirdly, let us discuss one more property of resultative constructions, which concerns the acceptability of derived resultative constructions. Consider the following examples:
(13) a. OK/?The rooster crowed the children awake. (=(10a)) b. OK/? *In the movie's longest love scene, Troilus and Cressida kiss most audiences squirmy.
(14) a. OK/*It snowed the roads slippery. b. OK/*It thundered the children awake. As the array of judgements above indicates, this type of resultative construction, where the subject of the resultative complement (e. g. the children in (13a)) is not a participant of the preceding subevent (e. g. the rooster crowed in (13a)), exhibits great differences in judgements of acceptability among speakers (or dialects).2 In (14), where there is no argument which appears in both of the two subevents and in addition the preceding subevent has no Agent, the acceptability further degrades. On the other hand, resultative constructions like (15) and (16), where the subject of the resultative complement is the affected object of the preceding subevent or identical with the agent of that subevent, show no differences in judgements.
(15) John cooked the food black. (16) Tom ran himself sick. These complicated phenomena, however, cannot be dealt with by any of the previous analyses. Recall that they just assume a single uniform rule of resultative constructions which subsumes all cases, making no distinction among them, apart from a two-way distinction 2 Carrier and Randall (1989) are more liberal about resultative constructions and regard all sentences in (13) and (14) as acceptable, while Jackendoff (1990) Accordingly, we need an alternative analysis which can account for these important properties of resultative constructions.
In order to describe the construction precisely, I would like to adopt the framework of cognitive linguistics in this paper. In the next section, we will begin by introducing cognitive models required to characterize resultative constructions. The canonical event model is constructed by combining the billiard-ball model and the stage model. The canonical event model inherits from the billiard-ball model the minimal conception of an action chain, in which one discrete object transmits energy to another through forceful physical contact. In Figure 1 , the head of the action chain is characterized as an agent (AG) that transmits energy (indicated by the double arrow), and its tail as a patient (PAT) that undergoes a resultant change of state (indicated by the wavy arrow). On the other hand, the stage model is a cognitive model which idealizes our observation of external events. In the stage model, an observer focuses attention on an action or event as if it were on stage, which can Langacker (1991: 285)) be taken as a type of setting within which the participants interact and the event takes place.3 Moreover, Langacker notes that we have a conception of certain typical roles that participants play in events, namely role archetypes such as Agent, Patient, and Experiencer.
For example, Agents are prototypically human entities which volitionally initiate physical activity by means of the transmission of energy to other participants.
Patients are prototypically inanimate entities that absorb the energy transmitted via externally initiated physical contact and thereby undergo an internal change of state.
The selection of the subject and object is linked with the relative salience which the figure/ground organization brings about. According to Langacker (1990) , a subject, as figure within the profiled relationship, is the participant that is farthest upstream with respect to the energy flow, whereas an object is the prominent participant lying the farthest downstream from the subject in the flow of energy.
Let us review another type of cognitive model proposed by Croft (1990 Croft ( , 1991 , who very explicitly identifies the conceptual basis of transitivity as causal and proposes another type of cognitive model, i. e. the causal chain. He defines the causal chain as "a series of causally related events such that the endpoint or affected entity of the causally preceding atomic event is the initiator of the next atomic causal event" (1991: 169).
Croft argues that a simple event consists of three segments, (i. e. CAUSE, BECOME, and STATE), and that the causal-aspectual type of the verbs (causative, inchoative, and stative) reflects what portion of the three segmented chain is selected, as illustrated in Figure 2 . Figure 2 shows us that the causative, inchoative, and stative event types 3 Setting is "a global, inclusive region within which an event unfolds or a situation obtains" (Langacker (1991: 553) ), while a participant is "an entity thought of as participating in a relationship" (ibid.: 550). are not independent.
In fact, the causal chain model allows us to unify these three event types into one.
Croft also argues that the causal chain model of event structure provides the major structure to an idealized cognitive model of a single event. Simple events involve asymmetrical transmission of energy, and their structure consists of the three-segment causal chain. Their chains are non-branching causal chains and endpoint-oriented.
The Integrated Cognitive Model
The two foregoing theoretical notions and cognitive models give us an appropriate means of analysis for various constructions, but it seems that neither model is sufficient for an analysis of the resultative construction.
Langacker's model cannot represent a resultant state, and Croft's model has trouble handling the difference in meaning between verbs in the same event type. Nakamura (1993) also takes these problems into consideration and proposes another cognitive model by incorporating Croft's notion of causal relations into Langacker's action chains in order to augment its efficiency.4
There are two differences in form between Langacker's model and this model. First, a change of state (i. e. wavy arrow) is represented outside a participant (a Patient), whereas it is represented inside a Patient in Langacker's model. Secondly, in Nakamura's model a resultant state can be represented after the change of state. These changes of representation allow us to unify the two foregoing cognitive models into one. In this integrated model, a circle symbolizes the initial state of a participant, a square representing the ultimate state. The double arrow indicates a transmission of energy, while the wavy arrow indicates a change of state without a transmission of energy. Each chain is enclosed in a dashed square which represents cognitive scope. Moreover, a figure/ground organization is incorporated into this model. The figure is depicted with bold lines, and the ground, with lighter lines.
Let us briefly look at how this model handles linguistic predications. For example, in the case of transitive verbs, e. g., kill and kick, the ungrammatical sentence (17a) indicates that kill specifies the change of 4 Nakamura 's (1993, 1994) model was originally proposed to represent a network of various grammatical constructions in a comprehensive manner. See Nakamura (1993, 1994) for details. state and the resultant state, whereas (17b) indicates that kick does not.
(17c) indicates that kill does not specify the transmission of energy.
(17) a. *John killed the dog, but it didn't die. b. John kicked the dog, but it didn't die. c. John killed the dog by kicking it.
(Nakamura (1993: 254)) The specified portion is represented in boldfaced line as figure, while the unspecified portion is represented in lightfaced line as ground. The construals (or cognitive structures) of the two types of transitive verbs are illustrated as follows:
In the case of intransitive verbs, for example, open, the construals are represented as sketched in Figure 3 (c). Let us compare (a) with (c) in Figure 3 . The difference between them is due to a difference in the cognitive scope. Thus the intransitive verb, open, implies neither Agent nor the transmission of energy.
The Cognitive Model Representing the Resultative Construction
Given the basic conceptions and framework of cognitive grammar in the previous section, we will explore how we recognize an event in using the resultative construction. In the construction, the action denoted by a verb has an effect on an entity denoted by a postverbal NP. As a result, the entity undergoes a change of state which a resultative complement characterizes. Based on Nakamura's (1993) representation of cognitive structures, we will represent the following situation within a cognitive scope as the cognitive model of the resultative construction: a double arrow which denotes the transmission of energy reaches the Patient from the Agent and a wavy arrow which denotes a non-energetic transition of the state reaches the resultant state. Moreover, resultative constructions normally imply that the causation is direct and that no intervening time in a causal sequence is possible. We can give neither different spatial settings nor different temporal settings to the verb and the resultative complement, as in (18) by setting it on the hot sand under the blazing sun. Thus, we can claim that the event denoted by a resultative construction is recognized as an event which takes place in one setting of space and time.
In accord with the fact mentioned above, I would like to diagram a cognitive model of a resultative construction, as in Figure 4 . Note that what Figure 4 shows is a prototypical cognitive model involving an Agent and a Patient.
The tail of the chain is the resultant state described by a resultative complement in the model. The Agent, the Patient and the resultant state are all included in its scope and the whole chain within the scope is surrounded by one setting. Furthermore, the whole chain within the scope is prototypically given greater salience via profiling. Following Langacker's (1990) selection of the subject/object, the Agent is a subject, and the Patient is an object in Figure 4 . This cognitive model can predict the various properties of a verb, two noun phrases (a subject and an object), and a resultative complement in the resultative construction.
We will further examine this in what follows. 4.1. Implications for Verb Types Not every verb can enter into the resultative construction. For example, not a prepositional object but an object is allowed to follow the verb in the resultative construction, as in (21).
(21) a. I {shot/*shot at} the wolf dead.
b. They {laughed/*laughed at} John off the stage.
(cf. They {*laughed/laughed at} John.) The semantic effect of assignment of an NP to object position instead of an oblique has been observed widely. For instance, Croft (1991) argues that, other things being equal, the object NP is conceptualized as being more affected by an action than the oblique NP. In the case of each prepositional object in (21), it seems reasonable to assume that no energy is transmitted from the subject to the object, or that the object is not affected by the designated action, as Figure 5 shows. Accordingly, prepositional objects cannot appear in resultative constructions, even though they are not normally allowed to follow the verbs without any prepositions.
Thus, a conception of the transmission of energy plays an important role in resultative constructions.
Moreover, this conception succeeds in excluding stative verbs from the resultative construction, as in (22), because a construal of stative verbs does not include the transmission of energy.
(22) a. *The Statue of Liberty stood green.
b. *Jesus lived into a legend. (Carrier & Randall (1989: 98) ) Langacker (1990) argues that a prototypical transitive clause profiles an action chain involving the transmission of energy from subject to object, with former being agentive and the latter undergoing a change of state. In the present framework, those transitive verbs are viewed as causative events. Note that the base of the resultative construction is also the causative construal. There are, in fact, many transitive verbs which can participate in the resultative construction as follows:5 (23) a. Mary broke the vase into pieces.
5 Though the construals depend on the verbs, the base of transitive verbs such as break and kick is certainly the causative base. See Figure 3(a-b) again. The meaning of a verb, however, depends not only on the base but also on profiling. In fact, there are transitive clauses that do not appear to involve a transmission of energy from subject to object. For example, the transitive verb touch has a causative base, but it cannot normally participate in the resultative construction, as in (24). (24) Moreover, clauses describing perception, emotion, or cognition do not appear to involve a transmission of energy from subject to object. Langacker (1990) assumes that the subjects in these clauses are Experiencers (i. e., they engage in some type of mental activity), and that the object is totally unaffected by the designated process. The interactions can be represented as follows, where the broken arrow indicates the mental contact of the Experiencers with the objects of perception, emotion, or conception:
Adding a resultative complement to a mental verb is, therefore, inconsistent with the resultative construction, as in (25). c. *He believed the idea powerful. (=(3b)) However, there are two ways to transmit energy, i. e. physically or metaphorically. Even if the construal of a verb, which has a causative base, does not profile the transmission of physical energy that brings about the resultant state, we can understand that the subject's intention is a kind of metaphorical energy in some context. The intention is able to let an object change and undergo a change of state. For example, the verb see in (25a) does not depend on the will, whereas we can regard stare in (26) as an intentional act. Therefore, the verb can appear in a resultative construction, as in (26).
(26) a. We stared her into confusion. b. ??Tom stared him {dumb/speechless}. Similarly, the verb touch does appear in resultative constructions only on its intentional reading, as in (27). (27) Let us first look into unaccusative verbs. The verbs may be divided Figure 8 7 Langacker (1991) describes a thematic relationship as a comparatively simple , conceptually autonomous relationship involving just a single participant. into the two following types: one can be used either transitively or intransitively without any difference in form, as in (28). The other type can be used only intransitively, as in (29). We will tentatively label the former type as unaccusative verbs of the freeze type, and the latter type as unaccusative verbs of the arrive type.
(28) transitive: John froze the ice cream solid. intransitive:
The ice cream froze solid.
(29) transitive: *A captain arrived the steamer in harbor. intransitive:
The steamer arrived in harbor. I suppose that unaccusative verbs of the arrive type are reasonably viewed in the present framework as single-participant thematic processes whose construal is absolute,8 because the verbs cannot be used transitively. Thus, in the case of the verb arrive, its construal is absolute and it specifies the goal (i. e. a kind of a resultant state), as sketched in Figure 9 .
Even if a resultative complement (and a reflexive) is added to this type of unaccusative verb, the sentence will be ungrammatical, as in (30), because the new construal made by adding a resultative complement is inconsistent with a cognitive model of the resultative construction.
(30) *John arrived (himself) sick. On the other hand, unaccusative verbs of the freeze type can be used transitively. The difference between an intransitive verb and a transitive verb is the difference in scope. In the case of the freeze type, since its construal has a causative base, it excludes the transmission of energy from an Agent out of the scope when used as an intransitive verb, whereas the transitive verb freeze involves it within the scope. Thus a construal of the verb freeze is shown as Figure 10 (transitive) Figure 9 x arrives 8 As for an absolute construal , Langacker (1991) argues that "an absolute construal... does not imply that the motion is conceived as being inherently nonenergetic, but rather that only the thematic process itself (i.e. the movement per se) is saliently evoked and placed in profile" (p. 390).
and Figure 11 (intransitive).9
If a resultative complement is added to this type of unaccusative verb, the verb can appear in the resultative construction, while the sentences are not prototypical resultative constructions.
(31) a. The water froze solid.
b. The vase broke into pieces. In this case, since the head of a profiled portion of action chain is selected as a subject, a Patient is selected as a subject within the limited scope consisting of two segments, as shown in Figure 12 .
Thus it is unaccusative verbs of not the arrive type but the freeze type that can appear in resultative constructions. This is because the cognitive structure of freeze subsumes the portion of the transmission of energy from an Agent even though it is outside of the scope, whereas the arrive type imposes an absolute construal on the movement it designates. This tells us that even in the case of intransitive verbs the problem of whether they can appear in resultative constructions has an important relation to the problem of whether the verb has a construal including the transmission of energy or not.
Let us now turn to unergative verbs. These verbs cannot appear in resultative constructions only by adding a resultative complement, as shown in (32). y freezes ZP 9 The transitive verb freeze , diagrammed in Figure 10 , does not specify the transmission of energy. This is because we can freely specify the way of transmitting energy by adding a by-phrase, as (i) shows:
(i) John froze the ice cream by exposing it to Dry Ice.
(32) a. *Bill danced sick. b. *Richard shouted hoarse. (=(6)) The construal of unergative verbs is also a thematic relationship, but it is not an absolute construal. Many unergative verbs are verbs in which the same participant both undergoes the thematic process and supplies the energy that brings it about. For instance, the subject of run, walk, jump, or dive not only moves through space but also carries out a pattern of muscular exertion to propel itself along this path. Thus the subject itself is both an energy source and an energy sink, as diagrammed in Figure 13 .
Recall that an energy source is distinct from an energy sink in the prototypical cognitive model of the resultative construction, as Figure 4 depicts. That is, it is necessary that energy is transmitted not internally but externally in order to bring about a resultant state denoted by an added resultative complement.
Accordingly, we can mentally restructure the conceived event diagrammed in Figure 13 , as sketched in Figure 14 . Figure 14 indicates that physical or volitional energy is transmitted from one participant (a subject) to itself (a dummy object) externally.
Thus a resultative complement can be predicated of a subject of an unergative verb through the use of a fake reflexive or an inalienably possessed NP (e. g. a part of subject's body), as in (33) and (34).
(33) John danced himself sick.
(34) Mark walked his feet to pieces. In this case, a fake reflexive or an inalienably possessed NP has to be coreferential to the subject, because this type of resultative construction supposes the cognitive model diagrammed in Figure 15 reflecting Figure  13 and Figure 14 . Having examined which type of verbs can appear in the resultative construction, we can summarize the description about verbs as follows:
(35) if a verb's construal includes a transmission of physical or metaphorical energy (within or without the scope) and profiles a portion of a non-energetic transition of the state or a potion of the state, the verb can occur in resultative constructions. This succeeds in excluding verbs with prepositional objects, stative verbs, and the arrive type of unaccusative verbs from the resultative construction.
Implications for Noun Phrases
According to Croft (1990) , it is required that causally related events share participants since the participant at the endpoint of one event is the initiator of the next, causally connected, event. In a resultative construction, it is necessary that an Agent and a Patient already exist in the cognitive scope as shown in Figure 4 , excepting unaccusative verbs of the freeze type. We can, therefore, predict that the following sentences are ungrammatical as resultative constructions:
(36) a. *Mary laughed silly.
b. *Peter ate full.
(37) a. *The ice froze itself solid. b. *He kicked the box Bill down the stairs.
(36a-b) are ungrammatical, because sentences lack a Patient. (37a-b) are also ruled out, because they have two distinct Patients. Moreover, our approach can apply to the sentences in which an object disappears or is created as a result of the action denoted by a verb, as in (38) x dances x' ZP (Michael T. Wescoat (p. c.)) Since each object in (38) and (39) does not undergo any other change, it is incompatible with a resultative construction. Figure 16 shows that the energy flow is broken, because the object of these verbs cannot exist throughout the activity denoted by the verbs.
Implications for Resultative Complements
As we have seen in section 1, the state denoted by resultative complements is not the Agent's state but the Patient's one, as in (40) and (41). (40) We cooked the food black. (cf. *We cooked the food sick.) (41) Tom shouted himself hoarse. (cf. *Tom shouted hoarse.) In Figure 4 , the resultant state follows a Patient, so that we can account for the property that resultative complements are objectoriented. Moreover, many researchers have observed that APs, PPs, and only a few NPs can be resultative complements.
However, in our model a resultant state is indicated as a square without any distinction of category. In what follows, we will look into these resultative complements respectively, and show that our representation is sufficient to handle the resultative complements.
Let us consider AP resultative complements first. It has been said that AP resultative complements in -ing and -ed are incompatible with resultative constructions as follows: (42) The gardener watered the tulips {* flattened/* wilting/flat/ soggy}. (Carrier & Randall (1992: note 212)) For -ed forms, a past participle describes a completed state. That is, resultative constructions using -ed resultative complements should suggest that the action of the verb results in the object already being in some particular state. This situation is causally too strange to be described by the resultative construction.
Our approach thus can exclude this type of AP resultative complement.
For -ing forms, Smith (1983) claims that -ing adjectives designate events rather than states. If this claim is correct, our model could exclude -ing adjectives, because they don't designate states. However, some -ed or -ing adjectives are allowed, as follows: (43 (1989: 6 )) It is probably easy to see that not a locative path phrase but a telic path phrase can be add to a verb as a resultative complement, as the following data show:
(47) a. They laughed Mary {*on the stage/off the staged}. b. Mary bullied John {*in leaving/*at leaving/into leaving}. This is because the telic phrase can predicate a state of the figure (i. e. postverbal noun) as an end-of-path.
We do claim that only PPs which denote an ultimate state can occur in resultative constructions.
As it turns out, resultative NPs are quite rare. A NP is not normally allowed to be added to a verb as a resultative complement, because a noun profiles a thing, not a state.
(48) a. *The baker pounded the dough a pancake.
b. *She ground the coffee beans a fine powder.
( Carrier & Randall (1989: 45) ) However, a very few NPs can be resultative complements.
(49) a. I painted the door a pale shade of yellow. b. She painted her barn a revolting shade of green.
Let us suppose that this type of noun is semantically close to adjectives and describes a state. If this supposition is correct, we will not need to make an exception for this type of NP. Thus, we can claim that only resultative complements which denote a state can appear in the resultative construction irrespective of morphology or syntactic category.
Analysis
In this section, I will provide my own solutions to the problems with the previous analyses I pointed out in section 2, on the basis of the cognitive model.
A Notion of Path and Resultative Constructions
Croft (1990), who proposed the causal chain, assumes that "there is an experiential relation between motion and causation that strongly suggests the path-based metaphors in which direction of motion is extended to direction of causation" (p. 197). Thus, the chain denoting the directionality of motion and the one denoting the directionality of causation are on different levels. This idea may be reflected in the following Unique Path Constraint proposed in Goldberg (1991a):
(50) Unique Path Constraint if an argument X refers to a physical object, then more than one distinct path cannot be predicated of X within a single clause. (ibid.: 368) This constraint can account for several co-occurrence restrictions on resultative complements.
For example, resultative complements cannot co-occur with directionals, because the directionals coding a change of physical location would code a distinct path from the resultative complements coding a change of state:
(51) *Ann kicked her black and blue down the stairs.
(ibid.: 369) Moreover, resultative complements cannot co-occur with directedmotion verbs when used literally, as in (52).
(52) *She ascended sick. (meaning the ascension made her sick) (Goldberg (1991b: 86) ) Note that we can also explain these co-occurrence restrictions by means of the cognitive model in Figure 4 . In (51), the chain denoted by the verb is construed as a branching chain, because one resultative complement codes a metaphorical path and the other codes a physical one. Moreover, (52) is ungrammatical, because the verb in (52) specifies a certain physical location within its scope and therefore its physical location does not accord with a resultant state denoted by the resultative complement.
However, some verbs coding just a physical path, i. e. some directed-motion verbs, are used metaphorically to code a change of state.
(53) a. The milk went sour. b. John fell asleep. When used in this way, these verbs imply no physical path. The difference between (52) and (53) is whether a verb specifies a physical location as well as a physical path, or codes only a physical path.
Let us first discuss a problem with the previous analyses, repeated here as (54).
(54) He threw the suitcase open. In our framework, this can be explained as follows: throw can imply no path when used with a resultative complement, in order to avoid the conflict with the metaphorical path coded by the resultative complement, open. It is possible, because throw codes a physical path only. Therefore, (54) does not mean that the suitcase moved somewhere literally. Of course, the resultative complement cannot co-occur with a directional phrase, although it is conceivable that a suitcase could be thrown into the room and open simultaneously, as in (55) (=(12)).
(55) a. *He threw the suitcase open into the room.
b. *He threw the suitcase into the room open. Thus a path denoted by a verb must not be distinct from a path denoted by a resultative complement within a cognitive model. Then, let us consider how our approach would handle the cooccurrence of two resultative complements in a resultative construction as in the following:
(56) a. He washed his face shiny clean. b. He nailed the door closed shut.
(Goldberg (1991b: 371), emphasis mine) In these cases, one resultative complement serves to modify the other, and together they form a single constituent.10 That is, they can be 10 We will consider two constituency tests to demonstrate our claim that the string shiny clean forms a single constituent in (56a). First, shiny clean may occur in the both ... and construction, which is known to require in general that its conjuncts be single constituents: metaphorically understood in terms of a single path. On the other hand, we can successfully disallow the following sentences:
(57) a. *She kicked him bloody dead.
b. *He wiped the table dry clean.
((ibid.: 370), emphasis mine) This is because two resultative complements designate two distinct changes of state. Therefore, the chain is construed as a branching one in the cognitive model of these resultative constructions.
In sum, we have seen that it is necessary to mention a notion of path in discussing resultative constructions.
A path defined by a verb and a resultative complement (or two resultative complements) must be a single path in a resultative construction, i. e., a chain must be a nonbranching chain in a cognitive model of a resultative construction.
Restrictions on AP Resultative Complements
The type of resultative complements that can appear in resultative constructions is fairly limited. In this subsection, we will first look at a restriction on AP resultative complements proposed by Goldberg (1991a) and Napoli (1992). As they have pointed out, most AP resultative complements denote an end of scale, as in (58)(=(9)). However, they give us no sufficient explanation and motivation for this tendency.
(58) a. She wrung the shirt {dry/*damp}.
b. We heated the coffee {hot/*tepid}. We will, therefore, try handling this restriction in our approach here. Let us begin with the effect of an added resultative complement. The following example indicates that an unbounded event denoted by an activity verb comes to be considered as a bounded event when a resultative complement is added:11
He washed his face both shiny clean and more importantly free of blemish-causing oil. (Michael T. Wescoat (p. c.)) Next, right node raising is known to affect only single constituents, and shiny clean may occur in critical position in this construction:
(ii) He washed his face and Mary scrubbed her hands shiny clean. (Michael T. Wescoat (p. c.)) Thus, the two foregoing constituency tests lead the same conclusion that the string shiny clean is indeed a single constituent.
11 According to Dowty (1979) , in-phrase is used as a diagnostic for accomplishments or achievements (i. e. a bounded event), while for-phrase is for activities (i. e. an unbounded event).
